B. Second Opinion

12. Another way of supposing these productions are distinguished is by the fact that one production is from one person and the other from two persons.

13. Against this is that, if the same thing is the formal principle of producing something, the principle of production will not be of a different idea because of its being in this supposit or in that, because whiteness in a stone and in a horse is a principle of making a change of the same idea in sight; so too, if the same whiteness were in two things and in one, it would be a principle of making a change of the same idea in sight. But these productions are distinguished in such a way that they are not of the same idea, therefore to this distinction another idea must be assigned than the unity or duality of the acting supposits.

14. Again, according to this way an infinite number of persons could be posited in divine reality; for a fourth person could be posited from the three, and a fifth from the four persons, nor would there be any idea of trinity in the divine persons if there was only a distinction through a unity, or plurality, of acting supposits, and there was no distinction through ideas of producing.

15. Again, every distinction is reduced to certain things primarily diverse, which things would be distinct if, per impossibile, they were separated from everything else, -    therefore this distinction is through some such things as would be distinct with everything else per impossibile left out and as would also be in themselves primarily diverse; the unity or plurality of acting supposits are not such things if there is not any other distinction in the principles of acting; therefore etc     . For when everything other than the unity or duality of supposits is removed, this unity or plurality do not seem to be the primary reason for distinguishing the productions.